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Frank Miller’s Sin City College 
Football: A Game to Die For And Other 
Lessons About the Right of Publicity 
and Video Games 
Jordan M. Blanke 
Abstract 
The challenge of finding a workable solution for applying the 
right of publicity is a formidable one because it implicates not only 
a delicate balance between First Amendment rights and the rights 
of publicity, but also the complications of varying state laws. The 
best of the tests developed by the courts so far—the transformative 
use test—was borrowed from copyright law and itself reflects a 
careful balance between First Amendment and copyright interests. 
Additionally, because of dramatic progress in technology, it is 
likely that in the near future this balancing will often involve not 
only the rights of publicity and the First Amendment but also 
copyright law as well. 
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I. Introduction 
In his excellent Note, Garrett Rice proposes a simple one-
sentence test as a solution for applying the right of publicity to 
video games.1 He outlines the history of the right of publicity and 
discusses the seminal cases, both those prior to and during the 
video game era.2 He examines the three most commonly used 
tests, the Rogers test, the predominant use test, and the 
transformative use test and appropriately rejects the first two 
outright.3 The Rogers test just was not designed nor intended to 
apply to something as complex as a video game, and the 
predominant factors test has been correctly described as 
“subjective at best, arbitrary at worst.”4   
The transformative use test, developed by the California 
Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,5 
(Comedy III) is “essentially a balancing test between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the work 
in question adds significant creative elements so as to be 
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally R. Garrett Rice, Note, “Groove is in the Hart:” A Workable 
Solution for Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 72 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 317 (2015). 
 2. See id. (providing a thorough discussion of the relevant history of the 
right and seminal case law animating it). 
 3. See id. at 333–40 (maintaining that the application of these tests has 
produced inconsistent and unpredictable results). 
 4. Id. at  362. 
 5. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
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or imitation.”6 This test has been the most commonly used one, 
but as Rice notes, it “is subjective and difficult to apply 
consistently as . . . contradicting district court rulings . . . highlight.”7   
Rice proposes a “readily identifiable” standard:  “A video 
game violates an individual’s right of publicity if a person 
familiar with the individual would look at a video game character 
and know immediately that the character is definitively based on 
the real individual.”8 Application of the test compares favorably 
with existing precedent. Rice applies it to five of the more recent 
video game cases with good results, yielding the same results as 
those found by the courts.9   
There remain, however, some larger issues that cast shadows 
on this still-developing area of law. I believe that there are four 
major challenges that still plague the balancing between and 
among the rights of publicity, the First Amendment, and 
copyright law. 
There is a great deal of First Amendment protection for both 
news reporting about public events, like football games, and for 
publicly available information, like the statistics generated by a 
football game.10 How will this federal protection be balanced 
against state right of publicity laws? 
State right of publicity laws vary greatly.11 Will a federal 
standard be able to apply to all the variations in these laws? 
Most right of publicity laws protect one’s “name and 
likeness,” and courts have traditionally treated it as one interest. 
Will courts continue the trend towards considering “name” and 
“likeness” as separate interests?”12 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. at 799. 
 7. See Rice, supra note 1, at 363. 
 8. Id. at  366. 
 9. See id. at 373–77 (indicating that the proposed test produces the same 
results with greater predictability and ease). 
 10. See infra Part III.A (noting that First Amendment protection exists 
because these are matters in the public interest and are not subject to copyright 
protection). 
 11. See infra Part III.B (pointing out that some states protect more 
characteristics than other states). 
 12. See infra Part III.C (indicating that courts sometimes discuss “name 
and likeness” as an interest without distinguishing between the two). 
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Tests that attempt to balance interests involving the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity (or the First Amendment 
and copyright) generally look at how much transformation there 
is between the original work and the second work. Just how much 
transformation is enough transformation to warrant independent 
protection for the second item?13 
II. Frank Miller’s Sin City College Football: A Game to Die For 
Before addressing these issues in more detail, let me first 
present a hypothetical example. Suppose that Arts Electronic, 
Inc. (AE) releases a new video game called Frank Miller’s Sin 
City College Football: A Game to Die For. The graphics in the 
game are quite beautiful—very stylized—just like a carefully 
drawn graphic novel. Most of the game is in black and white, 
although there are some brief bursts of color—mostly red. The 
field upon which the game is played is not your typical football 
field. The sidelines change continually. Sometimes there are 
cliffs, sometimes there are brick walls, and sometimes there are 
just dark, open spaces. The coach for one of the teams is Woody 
Hayes, of Ohio State fame—the other coach is Bear Bryant, of 
Alabama.  
One of the quarterbacks looks just like Ryan Hart14 and 
another one just like Sam Keller.15 The Hart character is 
interesting—with the pointer finger of his right hand he can 
levitate opposing players for fractions of a second. And the Keller 
character has the ability to become invisible for split seconds at a 
time. Both of these skills come in very handy on dashes to those 
                                                                                                     
 13. Infra Part III.D. 
 14. Ryan Hart played quarterback at Rutgers University from 2004 to 
2005. He brought suit against EA, alleging that his right of publicity had been 
violated because of his depiction in EA’s NCAA Football video game. The district 
court found for EA, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011), 
but the circuit court reversed, finding for Hart, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). See 
Rice, supra note 1, at 320–21. 
 15. Sam Keller played quarterback at Arizona State University from 2003 
to 2005. He brought a similar action against EA and won at both the district 
court and circuit court level, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 
WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), affirmed sub nom., In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). See 
Rice, supra note 1, at 320–21. 
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sidelines. There are two other characters in the game worth 
mentioning. First, there is a very large and brutal defensive 
lineman called Tony Twist—he is quite the enforcer. Second, 
there is a wide receiver named Ulala, who has quite an array of 
very tricky moves. 
Obviously, there would be some major trademark and 
copyright obstacles. Absent a license agreement from Frank 
Miller, Robert Rodriguez, or Dimension Films, trademark law 
would almost certainly prevent the use of either “Frank Miller” or 
“Sin City” in the title of the game.16 Similarly, there would 
probably be a successful copyright action if the expression in the 
game is as “substantially similar,” as the description above 
suggests, to the film and graphic novels upon which the film is 
based.17 Beyond that, however, some interesting questions 
remain. 
III. Four Challenges 
A. How Will Federal First Amendment Protection Be Balanced 
Against State Right of Publicity Laws? 
There is a great deal of First Amendment protection for 
public events, including sporting events.18 The statistics 
                                                                                                     
 16. While it might be difficult for Frank Miller to claim trademark 
protection in his name itself, the fact that it has been used in connection with 
Sin City several times would be important. See Brandon Johansson, Note, Pause 
the Game: Are Video Game Producers Punting Away the Publicity Rights of 
Retired Athletes?, 10 NEV. L.J. 784, 806 (2010); Anthony M. Verna III, 
www.whatisina.name, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 153 (2004). 
 17. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an author had mimicked the very distinctive 
style of Dr. Seuss and that the work was not a parody, was not transformative, 
and was not a fair use). 
 18. See generally Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It—You’ve Got to Have 
Hart: Simulation Video Games May Redefine the Balance Between and Among 
the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 26 (2013). See also Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that not only were 
newspaper accounts and photographs of Joe Montana’s performances in the 
Super Bowl entitled to First Amendment protection because they were matters 
in the public interest, but so were posters containing those same photographs). 
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generated by performance of a game are readily available in 
newspapers, protected by the First Amendment, and not subject 
to copyright protection.19 The fantasy sports cases from a few 
years ago plainly spell that out. In C.B.C. Distribution & 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,20 
(CBC) there was a question as to whether a licensing agreement 
was required in order for a fantasy sports league to use the 
names and biographical information of baseball players, along 
with the statistics generated by their performances on the field. 
The Eighth Circuit held that the players did have rights of 
publicity in that information under Missouri law, but that CBC’s 
First Amendment rights outweighed those rights of publicity.21 
The court held that because the information used by CBC in its 
fantasy games was already in the public domain, its use was 
clearly protected by the First Amendment.22 The court noted how 
important statistics and records had become in baseball and how 
it was part of the appeal of the game.23 Because the court held 
that First Amendment rights outweighed rights of publicity, it 
did not address whether federal copyright law would preempt 
state rights of publicity.24 
A district court in the Eighth Circuit took this holding even 
further. In CBS Interactive Inc. v. NFL Players Ass’n, Inc.,25 
(CBS) the District Court for the District of Minnesota held, as a 
matter of law, that CBS could use in its fantasy football game not 
only the names and statistics of the players but also the entire 
“package” of information about the players, including “names, 
player profiles, up-to-date statistics, injury reports, participant 
blogs, pictures, images, and biographical information.”26  
The environment for fantasy sports changed dramatically 
after these cases. For example, in the video game MVP Baseball 
                                                                                                     
 19. See generally Blanke, supra note 18, at 47–50. 
 20. 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court denied a petition for 
writ of certiorari, MLB Adv. Media v. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., 553 
U.S. 1090 (2008). 
 21. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822–24. 
 22. Id. at 823. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 824. 
 25. 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 26. Id. at 417. 
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2005, the slugging right fielder of the San Francisco Giants was 
named Jon Dowd, rather than Barry Bonds, because Bonds had 
not signed the Major League Players Association Licensing 
Agreement, and it was not clear whether the gaming companies 
could use Bonds’s name in the game without his consent. The 
performance of the Jon Dowd character in the game was identical 
to how the Bonds character would have performed because the 
programmers used Bonds’s statistics to generate the character. 
Certainly after the CBC and CBS cases, it is clear that fantasy 
sports games can include use of both the names of players and 
the statistics generated by the players. 
Many video games contain what is often called a career mode 
or a franchise mode. Rather than playing a game in which the 
user simulates the action of a sport by manipulating a keyboard 
or control pad to pitch, hit, throw, run, catch, kick or tackle, the 
user becomes, in effect, a general manager of the team. He or she 
drafts players, makes trades, sets starting lineups and rotations, 
and selects plays. Individual games or seasons of games can then 
be simulated, producing wins, losses and all the statistics a user 
cares to generate. These modes typically do not contain, nor do 
they need to contain, in order to be realistic, any images or 
likenesses of the players. 
It certainly follows from the CBC and CBS cases that all of 
the information used and generated in these career or franchise 
modes are protected by the First Amendment. Under the CBS 
holding, even pictures and images of the players would be 
protected.27 Even for the action modes of these video games, the 
CBS holding would suggest that the First Amendment would 
protect pictures and images of the players.28  
To a large extent, this issue goes beyond the test proposed by 
Rice. While he states about his test that “a video game deserves 
                                                                                                     
 27. See id. (“Thus, like in C.B.C. Distribution, the package of information 
used here comes within the ambit of the First Amendment.”). 
 28. It is certainly still the case that copyrighted photographs or images 
would not be able to be used in a video game without proper licensing; and it is 
certainly still the case that the logos of teams or leagues would not be able to be 
used without proper licensing. Even the CBS holding did not go as far as to 
include logos within the “package” of information that could be used without 
licensing. Id. However, just like the names of players, the names of teams and 
leagues should be fully protected by the First Amendment for use in a reality-
based sports game as they are readily and publicly available. 
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First Amendment protection if the individual’s likeness is not 
both immediately and definitely obvious,” there may be certain 
situations, like those in a career mode of a video game and 
possibly even in an action mode—certainly according to CBS—
where First Amendment interests will simply outweigh rights of 
publicity, and whether a character is readily identifiable is 
irrelevant.29 
B. How Will a Federal Standard Apply to the Variety of State 
Publicity Laws? 
Thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity either by 
statute or by common law.30 The laws vary greatly from state to 
state.31 Some protect more characteristics of a person than others. 
For example, New York protects only one’s “name, portrait, 
picture or voice,”32 while California protects one’s “name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness,”33 and Indiana protects one’s 
“name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive 
appearance, gesture, or mannerisms.”34 Certainly, under Indiana 
law, one could allege that a unique batting stance or a particular 
way of celebrating a touchdown has been misappropriated by a 
video game’s realistic portrayal of that activity. 
Even more troubling are the issues surrounding post-mortem 
rights of publicity and jurisdictional ramifications.35 Some states 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Rice, supra note 1, at 366–73 (advocating for a readily identifiable 
test). 
 30. See id. at 330 nn.82–83.  
 31. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 61–65 (“Among the . . . variations . . . are: 
(1) the scope of the right; (2) the rights of the deceased; (3) the duration of the 
right; (4) the jurisdictional domiciliary requirements; and (5) whether or not the 
right is to be applied retroactively.”); see also Brittany A. Adkins, Comment, 
Crying Out for Uniformity: Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of 
Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 
499, 501 (2010) (“[M]ost . . . states vary substantially in the methods chosen to 
protect one’s right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her 
persona . . . .”). 
 32. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2002). 
 33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012). 
 34. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (West 2002). 
 35. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 61–65 (noting that states’ laws vary 
greatly on this issue, which can entirely foreclose relief for plaintiffs). 
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provide for descendible and assignable rights of publicity after 
one’s death.36 Under California law, this right can last for 70 
years after death, in Indiana and Oklahoma, 100 years, and in 
Tennessee, forever.37 Cases have already dealt with complex 
issues pertaining to place of domicile, place of death, and whether 
the statutory or common law right of publicity existed at the time 
and place of death.38 
In my Frank Miller’s Sin City College Football example, 
Woody Hayes and Bear Bryant were domiciliaries of and died in 
Ohio and Alabama, respectively. Even if the laws of those two 
states do not provide for protection as broad as Indiana law or for 
as long as Indiana law, it may not matter to their heirs or 
assignees. Indiana law “applies to an act or event that occurs 
within Indiana, regardless of a person’s domicile, residence, or 
citizenship.”39 Both Hayes and Bryant no doubt played some big 
games against Notre Dame and Purdue within the state of 
Indiana. Furthermore, as long as a t-shirt with their image or a 
video game with their name or likeness or distinctive appearance 
or mannerism was sold in Indiana, an action may exist under 
Indiana law. 
There is, however, a big question as to whether states that do 
not have as broad a right of publicity will respect such reach. In 
Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc.,40 the 
District Court for the Southern District Of New York refused to 
recognize a right of publicity interest under Indiana law because 
at the time of her death, the deceased (Marilyn Monroe), was not 
an Indiana domiciliary nor did a post-mortem interest even exist 
under Indiana law.41  
In Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd.,42 
the Ninth Circuit decided a case involving a Washington state 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id. at 62–63; see Adkins, supra note 31, at 500–01 (describing 
differences in state law). 
 37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8; OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (West 2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1104(b)(2) (2012). 
 38. See generally Blanke, supra note 18, at 62–64; Adkins supra note 31, at 
505–29. 
 39. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2002). 
 40. 486 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 41. Id. at 314–16. 
 42. 742 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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right of publicity statute that applied “regardless of place or 
domicile or place of domicile at time of death.”43 The court stated 
that “Washington’s approach to post-mortem personality rights 
raises difficult questions regarding whether another state must 
recognize the broad personality rights that Washington 
provides.”44 While deciding that the statute was applicable in the 
instant case and that it need not address that broader issue, the 
court noted that a New York case had found to the contrary in 
Shaw.45   
While there have been arguments for a uniform right of 
publicity46 and for a federal right of publicity,47 I believe that the 
more likely resolution and the more practical approach will come 
from First Amendment or copyright preemption jurisprudence 
from the circuit courts and, eventually, from the Supreme Court. 
C. Will Courts Continue to Treat “Name” and “Likeness” 
Differently than “Name and Likeness?” 
Most right of publicity laws protect, among varying other 
things, one’s “name and likeness.”48 We are starting to see—and I 
think will continue to see—some distinctions being made between 
the two separate terms and the whole. In the CBC fantasy stats 
case, the Eighth Circuit held that the names of the players and 
                                                                                                     
 43. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010 (West, Westlaw through 2013 
legislation). 
 44. Experience Hendrix, 742 F.3d at 384. 
 45. Id. at 385 n.6. 
 46. See Adkins, supra note 31, at 524–53 (explaining that states vary on 
the right of publicity); Rice, supra note 1, at 353–54 nn.242–47 (proposing a 
readily identifiable standard). 
 47. See Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward 
a Limited Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a Digital Age of 
Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 944–57 (2013) (determining that 
Congress has this authority through the Commerce Clause); Sean D. Whaley, 
“I’m a Highway Star”: An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 260–66 (2009) (providing economic, moral, and federal 
authority justifications); Rice, supra note 1, at 354–57 nn.248–69 (proposing a 
unique federal standard); Blanke, supra note 18, at 64 n.332 (analyzing 
copyright law). 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–49 (1995) 
(providing an overview of right of publicity laws); Rice, supra note 1, at 330 
nn.82–83 (listing state right of publicity laws, either codified or in common law). 
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the statistics generated by their performances in a game were 
protected by the First Amendment.49 In the CBS case, a district 
court in Minnesota extended that holding significantly, including 
within that “package” of information, pictures, and images of the 
players.50 Obviously, this issue will be significant for video games, 
particularly those that are reality-based. 
In the Keller case, the Ninth Circuit held that “[u]nder 
California’s transformative use defense, EA’s use of the likenesses 
of college athletes like Samuel Keller in its video game is not, as a 
matter of law, protected by the First Amendment.”51 In O’Bannon 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,52 which dealt with several 
issues besides rights of publicity, the court spoke many times 
throughout its decision about “name and likeness,” but when it 
discussed the Keller holding, it not insignificantly referred to 
“likenesses” rather than “names and likenesses.”53 
Somewhat ironically, the NCAA Football games included 
everything but the names of the players.54 They included detailed 
biographical and physical information, player uniform numbers, 
performance ratings based upon actual game data, and accurate 
graphical depictions of the players.55 Certainly, in the context of 
the game, it was clear to a user who the characters in the game 
were because of the likenesses and the other biographical and 
statistical information. Users could add the names of the players 
if they so desired, and apparently, there were files available for 
                                                                                                     
 49. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F. 3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing the 
First Amendment claims brought by plaintiffs). 
 50. See CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 
259 F.R.D. 398, 417 (D. Minn. 2009) (explaining that the package of information 
at issue in the case falls under First Amendment protection). 
 51. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 
F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013). 
52  7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). For a thorough discussion of 
O’Bannon, see Marc Edelman, O’Bannon: A Small Step Forward for College-
Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2319 (2014).  
 53. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 977 n.13 (discussing Keller’s holding 
regarding the use of college athletes’ likenesses).  
 54. See, e.g., NCAA FOOTBALL 2005 (Electronic Arts, Inc. 2004) (depicting 
athletes but not including their names). 
 55. See, e.g., id. (providing many biographical details on players). 
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download that would add the names of all the players to the 
game.56  
A simple explanation for why the O’Bannon court may have 
referred to “likenesses” is that the NCAA Football game did not 
include the players’ names. However, in the context of the game, 
there was no doubt who the characters were. Furthermore, a 
better argument could be made by the players that they have a 
stronger right of publicity interest in their likenesses than in 
their names. As discussed above, the names and numbers of the 
players, along with the statistics generated by their on-field 
performances, would almost certainly be protected in both the 
career mode and the action mode of the game by the First 
Amendment.57 It still remains to be seen whether the holding of 
the CBS case will be extended to also protect pictures and images 
of players in the game.  
D. How Much Transformation is Enough Transformation to 
Warrant Independent Protection for a Second Work? 
The last challenge may be the most difficult: just how much 
transformation is enough transformation for a derivative item to 
warrant independent protection? This issue is not new to video 
games.58 It has been at the heart of the controversy in attempting 
to balance the interests protected by the First Amendment and by 
rights of publicity—and sometimes, also, by copyright.59 The 
                                                                                                     
 56. See, e.g., id. (allowing game users to add the names of players). 
 57. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing First 
Amendment protection of player information). 
 58. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 33–46 (addressing right of publicity for 
baseball cards and other images). 
 59. In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001), 
a case decided around the same time as Comedy III, the court held that there 
was First Amendment protection for a computer-altered photograph of actor 
Dustin Hoffman in a scene reminiscent of his role as a woman in the film 
Tootsie. It is one of the first times that a court recognized that the balancing 
might involving three important interests: “We evaluate this defense aware of 
‘the careful balance that courts have gradually constructed between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment and federal intellectual property laws.’” See 
id. at 1183–84 (quoting Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 
(6th Cir. 2000)). See generally Blanke, supra note 18 (covering First Amendment 
protection and rights of publicity). 
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problem is probably best exemplified by the discussion in Comedy 
III about the difference between an Andy Warhol rendition of 
Marilyn Monroe and a Gary Saderup rendition of the Three 
Stooges.60 
Gary Saderup is an artist.61 He created a drawing of the 
Three Stooges.62 When his company began selling t-shirts with 
this image, he was sued by another company that held the 
descendible rights of publicity of the Three Stooges, claiming an 
interest under California law.63 One of the toughest issues the 
court had to grapple with—and one I do not think it satisfactorily 
resolved—was how is a court supposed to determine when an 
“artist” adds enough “significant transformative or creative 
contribution” to a work to warrant First Amendment (or 
copyright) protection.64 
In attempting to distinguish the work of Gary Saderup from 
the work of Andy Warhol, the Comedy III court stated: 
[W]e do not hold that all reproductions of celebrity portraits 
are unprotected by the First Amendment. The silkscreens of 
Andy Warhol, for example, have as their subjects the images of 
such celebrities as Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and 
Elvis Presley. Through distortion and the careful 
manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message 
that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity 
images and became a form of ironic social comment on the 
dehumanization of celebrity itself. Such expression may well 
be entitled to First Amendment protection.65 
                                                                                                     
 60.  See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 
(Cal. 2001) (“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of context, 
Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial 
exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on 
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”). 
 61. See id. at 800 (“Saderup is an artist with over 25 years’ experience in 
making charcoal drawings of celebrities.”). 
 62. See id. at 801 (describing the charcoal lithograph Saderup made of the 
Three Stooges). 
 63. See id. (providing an overview and claims of the lawsuit). 
 64. See id. at 811 (addressing the issue of when a work of art can receive 
First Amendment protection). 
 65. Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted). Andy Warhol’s famous 
silkscreens of Marilyn Monroe were created in 1962 and based upon a publicity 
shot taken by photographer Gene Korman for the film Niagra in 1953. I have 
not been able to determine whether Korman gave permission to Warhol to use 
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Gary Saderup has available for sale on a web site,66 a 
portrait he made of Marilyn Monroe. How does a court determine 
whether this work is worthy of First Amendment protection? How 
does the court assess the “artistic” merit of the sketch? Does it 
compare the relative “artistry” of the work to his Three Stooges 
drawing or maybe to the Warhol depiction of Marilyn? Does the 
decision hinge upon the fame of the artist? Would Warhol’s 
Marilyn automatically get more protection than Saderup’s 
Marilyn because Warhol is more famous than Saderup? How and 
when does a court determine who will be tomorrow’s Andy 
Warhol?67 
There are no satisfactory answers to these questions. The 
determinations will be necessarily chock-full of subjectivity.  
This same quandary was involved in a dispute between Tiger 
Woods and a company that created a montage painting 
containing various images of Woods, the Masters’ Tournament, 
and other past champions of the Masters’ Tournament.68 The 
district court found that the painting violated Woods’s right of 
publicity under Ohio law.69 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed, and citing Comedy III, held that “when a work 
contains significant transformative elements, it is not only 
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also 
less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the 
                                                                                                     
the photograph or whether he was compensated for it, but it presents an 
interesting question: What if Korman had claimed a copyright interest in his 
photograph? Today this would involve a fair use or transformation analysis 
under copyright law, which would be very similar to the analysis involved in the 
right of publicity cases using the transformative use test from Comedy III. I 
believe that we will begin to see more and more of these balances involving all 
three of these interests. 
 66. See Marilyn Monroe, GALLERY4COLLECTORS, http://gallery4collectors. 
com/GarySaderup-MarilynMonroe.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (listing a 
portrait of Marilyn Monroe for sale and providing a short biography on her) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. See generally William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee 
Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1 (2012) (discussing how courts should decide rights of publicity in 
gaming). 
 68. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 38–39 (explaining the Tiger Woods 
dispute with a company over his image). 
 69. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (N.D. Ohio 
2000) (dismissing a motion for summary judgment because the painting had 
violated the right of publicity). 
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right of publicity.”70 The court continued, “[a]ccordingly, First 
Amendment protection of such works outweighs whatever 
interest the state may have in enforcing the right of publicity.”71 
Another way to view this issue is from the vantage point of 
the right of publicity. If its purpose is to protect—and potentially 
monetize—the fame and celebrity of an individual, is there 
anything that can outweigh this interest? Basically, in the 
context of video games, it may come from First Amendment 
protection for newsworthiness or from First Amendment 
protection for information that is publicly available and in the 
public domain (and not protected by copyright law).72  
Courts have had a difficult time trying to determine how 
much transformation is enough, or in the words of the Comedy III 
court, “whether the work in question adds significant creative 
elements so as to be transformed into something more than a 
mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”73 The California Supreme 
Court, which created the transformative use test in Comedy III, 
found enough transformation a few years later when a comic book 
depicted two brothers, Johnny and Edgar Autumn, as half-worm 
and half-human, with long white hair and albino features, based 
upon famous musician brothers Johnny and Edgar Winter.74 The 
California Court of Appeal also found enough transformation in a 
video game character, who like the lead singer of a retro-funk-
dance band popular in the 1990s wore platform shoes, brightly 
colored clothes, often with a number written on her chest, bare 
midriff, a blue backpack, red/pink hair, and pigtails and had a 
musical introduction with the words “ooh la la.”75 But the 
                                                                                                     
 70. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 
2001)).  
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra notes 18, 20 (regarding the Montana case and the fantasy 
stat case). 
 73. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 799, 808 (Cal. 
2001); see Blanke, supra note 18, at 39–46 (discussing the Comedy III 
transformative test). 
 74. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479–80 (Cal. 2003) (explaining 
that the comic book characters transformed enough to not violate right of 
publicity); see also Blanke, supra note 18, at 39–42 (discussing Winter); Rice, 
supra note 1, at 339–40 (same). 
 75. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 615–17 (Cal. Ct. 
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Supreme Court of Missouri, using the predominant factors test, 
rather than the transformative use test, did not find enough 
transformation in a comic book character named Tony Twist, 
whose name was admittedly borrowed from a tough hockey 
player known as an “enforcer,” but whose character was a Mafia 
don who looked nothing like the hockey player.76 The court noted 
how similar the facts were to the Winter case, but decided 
completely opposite.77 
Similarly, in the two cases involving exactly the same facts—
and the same NCAA Football video game—the district courts in 
California and New Jersey came to opposite conclusions.78 The 
Northern District of California held that the depiction of 
quarterback Sam Keller was not sufficiently transformative to 
bar his right of publicity claim;79 while the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey held that the depiction of quarterback 
Ryan Hart was sufficiently transformative and warranted First 
Amendment protection.80 The Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, however, did reach the same conclusion on review, 
holding that there was not enough transformation in the 
depiction of the quarterbacks.81 
                                                                                                     
App. 2006) (discussing the transformative test and its application to the current 
case); see also Blanke, supra note 18, at 43–44 (discussing the transformative 
test); Rice, supra note 1, at 342–43 (covering Kirby). 
 76. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (using the 
predominant factors test); see also Blanke, supra note 18, at 41–43 (discussing 
the transformative test in TCI Cablevision); Rice, supra note 1, at 340–42 
(same). 
 77. See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 373 (describing Winter as “a case with a 
remarkably similar fact situation”). 
 78. See infra notes 67–68 (discussing these cases). 
 79. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 794 (D.N.J. 2011) 
(concluding “that EA is entitled to First Amendment protection under either the 
transformative test or either of the Rogers’ tests”). 
 80. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10719, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“Assuming that the challenged causes of 
action arise from protected activity, Plaintiff makes a sufficient showing of his 
probability of success on the merits.”). 
 81. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We 
therefore hold that the NCAA Football 2004, 2005 and 2006 games at issue in 
this case do not sufficiently transform Appellant’s identity to escape the right of 
publicity claim . . . .”); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) (“EA’s use of the likenesses of college 
athletes like Samuel Keller in its video games is not, as a matter of law, 
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Basically the bottom line with applying these tests—and the 
nearly impossible determination of just how much transformation 
is enough—or alternatively, when a “work” becomes a “work of 
art”—is that different courts using different tests have come to 
different conclusions, and that different courts using the same 
test have come to different conclusions. 
In my Frank Miller’s Sin City College Football example,82 it 
would seem that the more different the Ryan Hart and Sam 
Keller avatars are from their real-life persona, the less likely that 
there would be a successful right of publicity claim. Certainly, 
that appears to be the case under the transformative use test—at 
least in most of the cases.83 Having the ability to levitate 
opposing players or to disappear may be the beginning of a 
sufficient enough transformation to warrant First Amendment 
protection. That surely seems to be the lesson from the Winter 
and Kirby cases.   
This becomes similar to using the “substantial similarity” 
test in copyright law in order to determine whether there is 
infringement. In Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer 
Electronics Corp.,84 the designer of a PAC-MAN-like knock-off 
video game had instructed his designers to make the characters 
in the game a little less like the original PAC-MAN characters in 
order to avoid a finding of “substantial similarity.”85 Even with 
these changes, however, the court held that the modified game 
still captured the “‘total concept and feel’ of [the game and was] 
substantially similar to PAC-MAN.”86 While a game designer 
might want to transform his characters just enough to avoid a 
finding of substantial similarity—or enough to warrant First 
Amendment protection as a transformative independent 
creation—the goal of a reality-based video game is to make the 
characters and the game as realistic and true to life as possible. 
                                                                                                     
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 82. See supra Part II (discussing this video game). 
 83. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 39–41, 43–44 (discussing Winter and 
Kirby); Rice, supra note 1, at 339–40, 342–43 (same). 
84  672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 85. See id. at 618 (describing the characters in the knock-off video game). 
 86. Id. at 619–20. 
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According to Rice’s readily identifiable standard, it is a 
person familiar with the individual who would have to know 
immediately that the character is definitively based on the real 
person.87 This would cover the situation where an obscure 
offensive lineman, familiar possibly only to his family and 
friends, might not be readily identifiable to an average game 
player. To the person familiar with the lineman, however, he may 
be readily identifiable.88   
Another possible wrinkle to this standard is particularly 
relevant to football. How readily identifiable are the characters 
when they have their helmets on? It might be difficult even for 
someone familiar with a player to recognize him with a helmet. It 
would probably be easier to identify a baseball player, who 
typically wears only a hat or maybe a batting helmet, and easier 
yet in a basketball or soccer game, where a player typically wears 
no hat or helmet, thus making him more readily identifiable. 
Should this play a role in the determination? 
IV. Conclusion 
While the readily identifiable standard may do a good job of 
identifying a possible violation of a right of publicity, there are 
several larger issues which may make this determination moot if 
more important issues outweigh that right in the first place. Just 
because one’s name or likeness is readily identifiable in a video 
game, it does not necessarily follow that one will (or should be) 
successful in a right of publicity claim. 
In a strong dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit Keller 
case, Judge Thomas states that the “essence of NCAA Football is 
founded on publicly available data, which is not protected by any 
individual publicity right.”89 He notes that the personal vital 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Rice, supra note 1, at 366 (“A video game violates an individual’s 
right of publicity if a person familiar with the individual would look at a video 
game character and know immediately that the character is definitively based 
on the real individual.”). 
 88. This may also be relevant to the discussion about whether a right of 
publicity protects only those who are famous, as it is more likely the 
quarterbacks, rather than the offensive linemen, will be well known. See 
generally Rice, supra note 1.  
 89. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 
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statistics of the players in the video game and the statistical data 
generated by their on-field performances are easily available and 
indistinguishable from the information used in fantasy sports 
leagues.90 “An athlete’s right of publicity simply does not 
encompass publicly available statistical data.”91 
Manuel Noriega, former military dictator of Panama, 
recently brought suit against Activision for his inclusion in the 
video game Call of Duty.92 His suit alleges a violation of his right 
to publicity under California law.93 The game depicts Noriega as 
a character in a reality-based history and war game.94 The 
situation is not much different than a reality-based sports 
game.95   
Judge Thomas recognized the potential elephant in the room 
in his Keller dissent, addressing the importance of the First 
Amendment when balanced against rights of publicity: 
The stakes are not small. The logical consequence of the 
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons, 
no matter how incidental, are protected by a state law right of 
publicity regardless of the creative context. This logic 
jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in motion 
pictures, books, and sound recordings. Absent the use of actual 
footage, the motion picture Forrest Gump might as well be just 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 1268, 1288 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 90. See id. (“[P]laying statistics are easily available.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Eugene Volokh, Can Manuel Noriega Really Win his “Right of 
Publicity” Lawsuit Against Activision?, WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/17/can-
manuel-noriega-really-win-his-right-of-publicity-lawsuit-against-activision (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2015) (describing the lawsuit) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Leo Kelion, Manuel Noriega Sues Activision Over Call of 
Duty, BBC (July 16, 2014, 7:51 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
28326670 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 93. See Volokh, supra note 92 (describing the possibilities of Noriega 
winning the right of publicity lawsuit). 
 94. See id. (“[T]he Noriega character is likewise represented in a realistic 
context, as someone quite similar to what he was . . . .”). 
 95. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 57–60 (discussing reality-based video 
games and their potential legal consequences). Reality-based music games also 
present similar questions, although there may be some additional copyright 
interests that make those situations even more difficult to resolve. Id. at 60–61 
(providing scenarios revolving around reality-based music games). 
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a box of chocolates. Without its historical characters, Midnight 
in Paris would be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble. 
The majority’s holding that creative use of realistic images and 
personas does not satisfy the transformative use test cannot be 
reconciled with the many cases affording such works First 
Amendment protection.96 
The right of publicity provides a person with the potential to 
benefit financially from his or her fame or celebrity. But just like 
every other right in a legal system, it is not an absolute. It must 
be balanced against other rights and interests. Balancing a right 
of publicity against the First Amendment is difficult to begin 
with. Add to that mix the very different protections afforded by 
varying state laws and it becomes even harder. Introducing a 
copyright interest makes it even more difficult. It is important for 
scholars and courts to experiment with different tests, but 
ultimately, this is an area of the law screaming for resolution by 
the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                     
 96. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 
F.3d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
